As Iran draws closer to a nuclear breakout capacity, what would be the implications of the current crisis in West Asia on the country's nuclear ambitions?
West Asia has been embroiled in brutal armed aggression ever since the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7th, 2023. This date is considered to have changed the dynamics of the region for the coming decades as it ripped open one of the most protracted and polarising conflicts in not just the history of the region but the world altogether. The Israeli aggression and devastating clampdown on Gaza will have profound effects not just on the larger question of Israel and Palestine but also on the security perception of the whole of West Asia and beyond. The powers that wield influence in the region have a stake in its security perception as well. The armed actions of the Houthis of Yemen and their official declaration of war against Israel, the attacks against US military bases in Iraq and Syria as well as the open expression of discontentment against the inertia of the international regime in curbing the disastrous actions of Israel- are evidence enough that there are more than two stakeholders in this conflict. In terms of the hardcore realist outlook, the Israel-Hamas war is will increase the security dilemma of the major states in the region, resulting in a possible arms race as well. The speculations of the war spilling out of Gaza are largely because of the actions of the one major power wielding immense influence in the region - Iran.
As the Israel-Hamas conflict continues to raise the threat perceptions of the neighbouring states in the region, it will have tangible repercussions for the wider security apparatus as well, translating well enough to conventional and non-conventional arms race. The main focal point in this regard remains to be Iran. The world’s attention at this point is placed on establishing a much-needed humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. At this point, it is also important to note that Iran is essentially on the brink of a nuclear breakout. What better time to keep investing in the nuclear weapons capabilities than during a full-fledged war in the region?
Let us go by statistics. For any state to acquire a weapons-grade nuclear capability, they must possess at least 90 per cent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) levels. Iran, at this point, is estimated to have enrichment levels of 84 per cent. It was earlier this year that the International Atomic Energy Agency stated that Iran has accumulated uranium that is enriched up to 84 per cent. This is significant. This puts Iran in the category of a nuclear threshold state considering that it can break out into a full-blown nuclear weapons capability as and when the need arises. As per the US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Colin Kahl, the breakout time for Iran, at this rate of development, is going to be as little as 12 days. This means the state could assemble a nuclear-powered weapon in 12 days when the need arises. When we consider Iran’s state security threats in the region, it becomes all the more significant that the state would seek to reach nuclear threshold capability. Consider the situation just before the fatal day of October 7th, Saudi Arabia and Israel were on the brink of a rapproachment that would create a new alliance in the region, an alliance of Iran’s two significant rivals in the region. While the deal has been halted in the aftermath of the recent aggression, its possibility has not been completely diminished, posing a perceptive threat to Iran.
On top of all this, Iran has also reduced access to verification, compliance and monitoring systems under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), limiting its capabilities to keep a check on Iran’s military nuclear power escalation. In recent developments, Iran removed all the verification equipment installed by the IAEA as a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thereby reducing the possibility of effective verification and compliance to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran’s pursuits of enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level have considerably increased since the beginning of the Biden administration in the USA took control and more so because, unlike his predecessor, Biden has been reluctant to employ stringent measures to check Iran’s nuclear activities. Even posing a nuclear breakout option in the region gives Iran enough leverage to continue wielding massive influence in West Asia, something that has also possibly deterred the United States from taking direct action against Iranian aggression towards the US military basis amidst the ongoing crisis.
The JCPOA and a diplomatic impasse
Things are likely to take a more peculiar turn when we consider the redundancy of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran Nuclear Deal that has guided international actions towards curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Considering Iran’s escalation towards enriching weapons-grade uranium, it may be right to assume that the deal has reached a stalemate. While Iran maintains that the other signatories of the deal have not fulfilled their commitments under the deal, states like the UK Frace, Germany suggest that Iran’s nuclear development is not for civilian purposes, contrary to the official position of the Iranian state. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA under former President Trump dealt a significant blow to all the headways made within the framework of this deal. A mess that the Biden administration is trying hard to clean up. The administration is seeking to restore the talks however under the present circumstances this seems to be a mammoth task.
Adding more complexity to an already complex picture is another angle to this story. As per the previously agreed clauses under the JCPOA and the subsequent UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsing the deal, all the sanctions regarding restrictions placed on the export of ballistic missile technologies and related sensitive technologies expired in October of 2023. Taken in the context of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the regional security crisis perpetrated by the Israel-Hamas war, Israel’s devastating aggression and the resulting humanitarian crisis in Gaza as well as the heightened threat perceptions by the seemingly normalizing Arab-Israeli relations, the removal of restrictions on Iran’s export of ballistic missile would have repercussions for its military alliances with like-minded states. The most significant of these is Russia. Russia has found an ally in Iran since waging its war on Ukraine. The continued offensives and counter-offensives in Europe have opened doors for Iran to extend its military partnership with Russia, exporting military equipment to the state. The West, especially the US and the UK have accused Iran of supplying Russia with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to aid its aggression against Ukraine. Even though reports and allegations of conventional arms transfers have surfaced, no such records have depicted the ballistic missile transfers from Iran outside of the region. However, the state has engaged in ballistic and cruise missile transfers to Syria and other non-state proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. This highlights the potential for an unprecedented arms race in the region, if Iran continues to pursue a policy of uranium enrichment
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