The Trump-brokered ceasefire: A litmus test for the Quad and regional stability

The recent U.S.-brokered ceasefire between India and Pakistan, announced by President Donald Trump on 10 May 2025, underscores the enduring complexities of regional tensions and strategic alignments in South Asia. Crucially, this development serves as a litmus test for the Quad Security Dialogue—a cornerstone of the United States’ broader Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at counterbalancing China’s ascent and anchoring regional stability. While the ceasefire offers a temporary halt to hostilities, it simultaneously raises pressing questions about the depth and reliability of Washington’s alignment with India—an indispensable Quad partner.

President Trump triumphantly declared:

“After a long night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a FULL AND IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. Congratulations to both countries on using Common Sense and Great Intelligence.”

Historically, relations between India and Pakistan have been marked by cycles of hostility and fragile peace accords. The May 2025 ceasefire, though initially promising, has already shown signs of unravelling. India has accused Pakistan of violating the truce almost immediately through drone incursions and explosions in the disputed Kashmir region—allegations predictably denied by Islamabad. This all-too-familiar cycle of claim and counterclaim lays bare the brittleness of peace efforts between two nuclear-armed neighbours and illustrates the limits of external mediation in resolving entrenched geopolitical grievances.

From New Delhi’s vantage point, American involvement in facilitating this ceasefire is both consequential and fraught. On one hand, the Trump administration’s decision to intervene reflects a shift from the long-standing U.S. posture of ambiguity and restraint on the Indo-Pakistani question. Successive U.S. governments have traditionally deferred to India’s policy of bilateralism, avoiding overt mediation. Trump’s assertive diplomacy might, therefore, indicate a willingness to align more closely with India’s strategic priorities in accordance with Quad objectives. On the other hand, India’s measured reaction to the mediation underscores long-standing concerns rooted in historical inconsistency.

India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, cautiously welcomed the ceasefire but underscored India’s red lines:

“India and Pakistan have today worked out an understanding on stoppage of firing and military action. India has consistently maintained a firm and uncompromising stance against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It will continue to do so.”

Yet within hours, reports of Pakistani drone activity across the Line of Control emerged.

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed:

“Pakistan has violated the understanding arrived at by the two countries earlier in the day, and the Indian armed forces have been instructed to deal strongly with any repetition.”

Central to Indian apprehensions is the enduring American ambivalence toward Pakistan’s role in fostering terrorism. During the Global War on Terror, Washington’s strategic reliance on Islamabad frequently translated into leniency, even as Pakistan’s deep-state actors supported militant proxies targeting both India and Afghanistan. Despite voluminous evidence and a clear international consensus regarding Pakistan’s complicity, successive U.S. administrations have opted for pragmatic accommodation over principled condemnation. India now fears that the Trump administration’s overture might be less about reinforcing Quad solidarity and more about tactical optics—a move dictated by short-term diplomatic expediency rather than long-term strategic alignment.

For India, the Quad is not merely a multilateral forum; it is a strategic insurance policy. The group’s raison d’être—containing China’s assertive influence across the Indo-Pacific—requires that all member states display unambiguous commitment to each other’s core security concerns. If Washington’s engagement with Pakistan is perceived as transactional or indifferent to Indian red lines, then the Quad risks internal dissonance, weakening its cohesion and undermining its credibility as a strategic alliance.

While Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated U.S. neutrality and constructive intentions, he was careful not to assign blame:

“The United States facilitated discussions between India and Pakistan, leading to an agreement on a full and immediate ceasefire and the initiation of talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.”

Such caution, while diplomatically understandable, is politically problematic. It feeds Indian scepticism about whether the U.S. truly regards Indian security concerns as integral to its Indo-Pacific calculus.

Complicating matters further is Pakistan’s deepening alliance with China. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other strategic linkages, Beijing has become Islamabad’s principal benefactor, providing economic sustenance and diplomatic cover. This nexus means any India-Pakistan flashpoint risks becoming a regional tinderbox, with wider implications for Quad strategy. The group cannot afford to treat Pakistan as an isolated irritant; it must recognise that Pakistan’s manoeuvrability and defiance are inextricably linked to Chinese patronage. Acknowledging this connection is essential for crafting a coherent, integrated approach to regional security.

For its part, Pakistan has sought to portray the ceasefire as a goodwill gesture, not a concession. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated:

“As a responsible state, we have responded positively to the ceasefire proposal in the interest of global and regional peace... We firmly believe that all outstanding issues, including the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir and the distribution of water resources, should be resolved through peaceful dialogue.”

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed this, while reaffirming Pakistan’s sovereignty:

“Pakistan and India have agreed to a ceasefire with immediate effect. Pakistan has always strived for peace and security in the region, without compromising on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

To strengthen the Quad and reassure its partners, the United States must shed outdated compartmentalised frameworks. India’s security cannot be seen through a narrow lens; it must be treated as a central pillar of Indo-Pacific stability. Washington must explicitly link its Pakistan policy to the broader Quad agenda, signalling that transnational terrorism—particularly when state-enabled—will not be tolerated under the guise of diplomatic balance. Without such clarity, India will justifiably question the credibility of American commitments, and by extension, the viability of the Quad as a strategic alliance.

Further, the Trump administration must speak with greater consistency and conviction on Pakistan's record. So long as Islamabad continues to shield or sponsor terror groups, no ceasefire can be genuinely sustainable. American equivocation on this issue only emboldens destabilising actors and damages U.S. standing in the region. A clear, public stance against terrorism originating from Pakistani soil would send a powerful message—not just to Islamabad, but to the entire Indo-Pacific—that the U.S. stands unequivocally with its Quad allies.

The May 2025 ceasefire, while important, cannot be mistaken for strategic progress. Lasting peace in South Asia demands more than temporary truces—it requires a concerted and principled alignment among Quad members, grounded in transparency, trust, and shared purpose. If the Trump administration hopes to elevate the Quad into a formidable strategic axis, it must match its rhetoric with action. By fully integrating Indian security into the Indo-Pacific framework, Washington can help transform the Quad from a flexible dialogue into a durable security alliance—one capable of deterring aggression, confronting terrorism, and preserving stability across the region.

President Trump may well be transactional, but many Indians are feeling short changed.